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Abstract. We propose the study of computing the Shapley value for a
new class of cooperative games that we call budgeted games, and inves-
tigate in particular knapsack budgeted games, a version modeled after
the classical knapsack problem. In these games, the “value” of a set S of
agents is determined only by a critical subset T ⊆ S of the agents and
not the entirety of S due to a budget constraint that limits how large
T can be. We show that the Shapley value can be computed in time
faster than by the na¨ıve exponential time algorithm when there are suf-
ficiently many agents, and also provide an algorithm that approximates
the Shapley value within an additive error. For a related budgeted game
associated with a greedy heuristic, we show that the Shapley value can
be computed in pseudo-polynomial time. Furthermore, we generalize our
proof techniques and propose what we term algorithmic representation
framework that captures a broad class of cooperative games with the
property of efficient computation of the Shapley value. The main idea is
that the problem of determining the efficient computation can be reduced
to that of finding an alternative representation of the games and an asso-
ciated algorithm for computing the underlying value function with small
time and space complexities in the representation size.
1 Introduction
The Shapley value is a well-studied solution concept for fair distribution of profit
among agents in cooperative game theory. Given a coalition of agents that col-
lectively generate some profit, fair distribution is important to maintain a stable
coalition such that no subgroup of agents has an incentive to unilaterally deviate
and form its own coalition. While the Shapley value is not a stability concept,
it uniquely satisfies a set of desirable properties for fair profit distribution based
on individual contributions. It has been shown useful on a wide range of coop-
erative games and, more recently, applied beyond the game-theoretic setting in
problems related to social networks [18, 16] and computer networks [13, 17].
⋆ This work was done while the author was an intern at Technicolor Research Lab.
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Efficient — (pseudo) polynomial time — computation of the Shapley value
has been studied for many classes of cooperative games. One such example is
weighted voting games that model parliamentary voting where agents are parties,
the weight of each party is the number of the same party representatives, and
a coalition of parties is winning (has value 1) if its total weight is at least some
quota, or losing (has value 0) otherwise. It was shown that computing the Shapley
value in the weighted majority games, where the quota is half the total weight of
all the agents, is #P-complete [7] and NP-hard [15]. Note, however, that there
is a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm using dynamic programming [14].
In another line of research, representation schemes for cooperative games have
been proposed in [6, 10, 11, 1]; if a given cooperative game has a small alternative
representation in one of these schemes, then the Shapley value can be computed
efficiently in time polynomial in the size of the alternative representation. For
example, we can represent a given cooperative game as a collection of smaller
cooperative games in multi-issue representation [6], or in terms of logic rules in
marginal contribution net representation [10].
We propose a new class of cooperative games that we call budgeted games and
study the Shapley value computation in these games. In cooperative games, the
value function v(S) for a coalition S is determined by all the agents in S, but may
explicitly depend on a sub-coalition in some domains (e.g., [3, 5, 2]). We study
value functions conditioned on a budget B where v(S) may be totally determined
by a potentially strict subset T ⊂ S of agents. That is, budget B models a
physical or budget constraint that may limit the actual value of a coalition to be
less than simply the total aggregate value of all the individual contributions and,
hence, the profit generation of a coalition is determined only by a sub-coalition
of the agents. There are many examples we can readily formulate as budgeted
games to model real-life scenarios:
– (Graph Problems) Consider a network of nodes that correspond to facilities
and edges between them that correspond to communication links. This can
be modeled as a graph G with weights on nodes. For any subset S of nodes,
vB(S), the value created by set S under budget B, may be the maximum
weight of an independent set of at most B nodes.
– (Set Problems) Let each agent be a sales agent targeting a specific set of
customers. Then vB(S) may be the maximum number of customers that can
be targeted by a subset of size at most B of sales agents from S.
– (Packing Problems) Consider creating a task force from a pool S of avaliable
agents where each agent is associated with some value and cost. Then vB(S)
may be the largest total aggregate value from a subset of the agents with
total cost at most B.
– (Data Mining Problems4) Let each agent represent a document with some
quality measure with respect to a fixed search query. We may approximate
the total value of an ordered list of documents S, ordered by the quality
4 This is the Shapley value computation problem for what is commonly known as the
Top-k problem.
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measure, by those that appear at the top of the list. Then, the corresponding
vB(S) is the sum of the top B quality scores of documents in S.
For the Shapley value to be useful in value division problems modeled as
budgeted games, we cannot simply apply the formula for the Shapley value as it
would lead to an exponential time algorithm. Hence, it is important to under-
stand its computational complexity in these games, and we study the knapsack
version (equivalently, Packing Problems) in this paper. As far as we know, the
budgeted games have not been studied previously. A related class of games called
bin-packing games [8, 12, 19] has been studied for different solution concepts of
core and ǫ-core.5
Our Contributions. First, we propose a new class of cooperative games, bud-
geted games, and investigate the computational complexity of the Shapley value
in a particular version of budgeted games. Second, we generalize our proof tech-
niques and propose a general framework, algorithmic representation, for cooper-
ative games. We note that all our algorithms have running times with a polyno-
mial dependence on the number of agents. More specifically, our contributions
are as follows:
– We study the knapsack version of budgeted games and show that computing
the Shapley value in these games is NP-hard. On the other hand, we show
that the Shapley value can be computed in time faster than by the na¨ıve
exponential time algorithm when there are sufficiently many agents.
– We provide an additive approximation scheme for the Shapley value via
rounding; our approach does not use the standard sampling and normal
distribution techniques [4, 9] in estimating the Shapley value.
– We consider the value function obtained by a 2-approximation greedy algo-
rithm for the classical knapsack problem and show that for this function, the
Shapley value can be computed in pseudo-polynomial time.
– We provide generalizations and present the algorithmic representation frame-
work that captures a broad class of cooperative games with the property of
efficient computation of the Shapley value. This includes many known classes
of cooperative games in [7, 14, 16] and those with concise representations us-
ing schemes in [6, 10, 1].
2 Preliminaries
We represent the profit distribution problem as a cooperative game (N, v) where
N is the set of agents and v : 2N → R is the characteristic function that assigns
a value to each subset of agents, with v(∅) = 0. We also call v the value function
and use both characteristic and value functions interchangeably. For a subset of
5 While items and bins separate and bins model linear constraints in knapsack bud-
geted games, both items and bins are treated as agents and the goal is to share profit
among them in a fair way in bin-packing games.
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agents S ⊆ N , we interpret v(S) as the value that these agents can generate
collectively; v(N) is the total value that the whole group generates.
The Shapley value [20] is a solution concept based on marginal contributions
that divides the total value v(N) into individual shares φ1, . . . , φ|N | satisfying
an intuitive notion of fairness. For i ∈ N and S ⊆ N \ {i}, we define agent i’s
marginal contribution to S to be v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S). The Shapley value is the
unique profit distribution solution that satisfies the following properties:
1. (Efficiency)
∑
i∈N φi(v) = v(N);
2. (Symmetry) If v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) = v(S ∪ {j})− v(S) for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j},
then φi(v) = φj(v);
3. (Null Player) If v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N \ {i}, then φi(v) = 0;
4. (Linearity) For any two cooperative games (N, v) and (N,w) and their com-
bined game (N, v + w), φi(v) + φi(w) = φi(v + w) for all i ∈ N .
The Shapley value for each agent i is computed as
φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|!(|N | − |S| − 1)!
|N |!
(v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)). (1)
Note the Shapley value is a weighted average of agent i’s marginal contribu-
tions. Equivalently, it can also be computed as φi(v) =
1
|N |!
∑
π∈Π v(P
i
π ∪{i})−
v(P iπ), where Π is the set of all |N |! permutations of the agents and P
i
π is the
set of agents preceeding agent i in the order represented by permutation π.
There are two sources of computational complexity in the Shapley value: an
exponential number of terms in the summation and individual evaluations of
the characteristic function v. Directly applying the above equations leads to a
na¨ıve algorithm with running time at least exponential in the number of agents,
Ω(2|N |); furthermore, each individual evaluation of v can be expensive.
3 Knapsack Budgeted Games
A knapsack budgeted game (N, v) is a cooperative game with the alternative rep-
resentation given by a nonnegative integer tuple ({(l1, w1), . . . , (l|N |, w|N |)}, lbin)
such that v(S) = maxS′⊆S:l(S′)≤lbin w(S
′) for all S ⊆ N , where l(S′) =
∑
k∈S′ lk
and w(S′) =
∑
k∈S′ wk. Each agent i is described by (li, wi) where li and wi
are the agent’s length and weight, respectively. The variable lbin is the bin size
that restricts which set of agents can directly determine the value function v.
For a set of agents S, the value v(S) is determined by solving an optimization
problem where the total value of selected agents, possibly a strict subset of S,
is optimized subject to a budget constraint; the other unselected agents do not
contribute explicitly. Note the similarities with the classical knapsack problem
in which the objective is to find the maximum total value of items that can be
packed into a fixed size bin.
Knapsack budgeted games are useful when the characteristic function v of a
cooperative game can be modeled as the objective value of an optimization prob-
lem subject to linear constraints. In this paper, we only consider the games with a
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single linear constraint, but our results extend to knapsack budgeted games with
multiple linear constraints. In a knapsack budgeted game with multiple budget
constraints, each agent is associated with a length vector l = (l1, . . . , ld) and a
weight and there is a budget constraint on each coordinate, i.e., l1bin, . . . , l
d
bin,
assuming d budget constraints.
For an application, we can use knapsack budgeted games and the Shapley
value to model value division in a sport team. We would like to give out bonuses
proportional to the Shapley value solution. Assume each player i is associated
with a skill level wi and, in a game of the sport, at most B players from each
team can play. We model the value of the team as the total aggregate skill
level of its best B players, since they usually start and play the majority of the
games. Then, this is a knapsack budgeted game with skill levels as weights, unit
lengths, and lbin = B. Note the Shapley value of a player not in the top B may
be positive. Since he is still contributing to the team as a reserve player and
might be one of the top B players in a subset of the team, say available players
in an event of injury, he should be compensated accordingly.
In the following sections, we assume that the knapsack budgeted game (N, v)
has the representation ({(l1, w1), . . . , (l|N |, w|N |)}, lbin). We define wmax = ⌈lbin ·
maxiwi/li⌉, which is an upper bound on the value v(N). We use shorthand
notations l(S) =
∑
k∈S lk and w(S) =
∑
k∈S wk for any subset S. The set of
agents are ordered and labeled with 1, . . . , |N |. For a set of agents X and two
integers a and b, we use Xa,b to denote the subset {i ∈ X : a ≤ i ≤ b}. To avoid
degenerate cases, we further assume 0 < li ≤ lbin for all i. We use the indicator
function Id that equals to 1 if all the input conditions hold, or 0 otherwise.
4 The Shapley Value in Knapsack Budgeted Games
We present a hardness result, an algorithm for computing the Shapley value
exactly, and a deterministic approximation scheme that approximates within an
additive error.
4.1 Exact Computation
By the NP-completeness of the classical knapsack problem and the efficiency
property of the Shapley value, it follows that (see Appendix A for details):
Theorem 1. The problem of computing the Shapley value in the knapsack bud-
geted games is NP-hard.
While a polynomial time algorithm for computing the Shapley value may
or may not exist, the na¨ıve exponential time algorithm is too slow when |N | is
large. When |N | is sufficiently large, especially when |N | ≫ lbin, we show that a
faster algorithm exists:
Theorem 2. In the knapsack budgeted games, the Shapley value can be com-
puted in time O(lbin(wmax + 1)
lbin+1|N |2) for each agent.
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To prove Theorem 2, we associate each subset S ⊆ N with a vector from a
finite-sized vector space that completely determines an agent’s marginal contri-
bution to S. If the cardinality of the vector space is small and the partitions of
the 2|N | subsets corresponding to the vectors can be found efficiently, we can
evaluate v once for each vector instead of once for each subset, reducing the
overall computation time. Note that the well-known dynamic programming al-
gorithm, call it A, for the classical knapsack problem can be used to compute
v; for a given S, the algorithm iteratively updates an integer array of length
lbin + 1 holding the optimal values for the sub-problems with smaller bin sizes
and returns a final value determined by the array at termination.6 We associate
with each subset S the final state of the array when A runs on S and determine
the cardinalities of resulting partitions using a dynamic program, different but
related to A; the dynamic program counts the number of optimal solutions to the
sub-problems grouped by objective value while A simply computes the optimal
solutions to the sub-problems.
We use the following lemma to prove Theorem 2; it shows that if the set of
possible marginal contribution values for agent i is small, then we can reduce
the number of evaluations of v by grouping subsets of N \ {i} by marginal
contribution value and evaluating v once for each group (see Appendix A for a
proof).
Lemma 1. Assume there exist positive integers pi and partition functions Pi :
2N\{i} → {1, . . . , pi}, for i = 1, . . . , |N |, such that if Pi(S) = Pi(S′) for two
different S, S′ ⊆ N \ {i}, then v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) = v(S′ ∪ {i}) − v(S′). Let
mi(p) be agent i’s marginal contribution to S for all S satisfying Pi(S) = p, and
c(i, s, p) = #{S ⊆ N \ {i} : |S| = s, Pi(S) = p} for i ∈ N , 0 ≤ s ≤ |N | − 1, and
1 ≤ p ≤ pi. Then, the Shapley value for agent i can be computed as
φi =
∑pi
p=1
∑|N |−1
s=0 c(i, s, p)
s!(|N |−s−1)!
|N |! mi(p)
in time O(pmax(t + q)|N |), where pmax = maxi pi, t is an upper bound on the
computation time of the coefficients c, and q is the evaluation time of v.
We now prove Theorem 2 by applying Lemma 1:
Proof. (of Theorem 2) We compute the Shapley value for some fixed agent i.
We define VA,b = maxS′⊆A:l(S′)≤b w(S
′), for A ⊆ N and 0 ≤ b ≤ lbin, and
vector VS = (VS,0, . . . , VS,lbin), for subsets S ⊆ N . Let V be the finite vector
space {0, . . . , wmax}lbin+1 that contains vectors VS . We use the 0-based index
to indicate coordinates of a vector in V ; so, v(S) = VS,lbin = VS(lbin) for all S.
GivenVS , agent i’s marginal contribution to S can be computed in constant time
as v(S ∪{i})− v(S) = max{VS(lbin− li)+wi−VS(lbin), 0}. Let this expression
6 Assume the agents in S are labeled 1, . . . , |S| for simplicity. For 1 ≤ j ≤ |S|, we define
c(j, b) = maxS′⊆S1,j :l(S′)≤b w(S
′). It has the recurrence relation c(j, b) = max{c(j −
1, b), c(j − 1, b − lj) + wj}. We compute c(j, b)’s and, hence, v(S) = c(|S|, lbin) in
O(|S|lbin) time.
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be defined more generally as mi(v) = max{v(lbin − li) + wi − v(lbin), 0} for
v ∈ V .
We partition 2N\{i} by the pair (|S|,VS) so that for each possible (s,v) pair,
all subsets S satisfying |S| = s and VS = v are grouped together. Clearly, the
marginal contribution of agent i is the same within each partition. To compute
the cardinality of each partition, we use dynamic programming. LetN ′ = N\{i},
ordered and relabeled 1, . . . , |N | − 1. For 0 ≤ j ≤ |N | − 1, 0 ≤ s ≤ j, and v ∈ V ,
we define cˆ(j, s,v) = #
{
S ⊆ N ′1,j : |S| = s,VS = v
}
. Note cˆ has the recurrence
relation
cˆ(j, s,v) = cˆ(j − 1, s,v) +
∑
u:UPDATE(u,l′
j
,w′
j
)=v cˆ(j − 1, s− 1,u),
with the base case cˆ(0, 0,0) = 1, where l′j and w
′
j correspond to the j-th
agent in order in N ′ and UPDATE is an O(lbin) algorithm that updates u
with the additional agent: 1) Initialize v = u; 2) For j = l′j, . . . , lbin, v(j) =
max{v(j),u(j − l′j) + w
′
j}; and 3) Return v.
Using the recurrence relation, we compute cˆ(j, s,v) for all j, s, and v in time
O(lbin(wmax + 1)
lbin+1|N |2). By Lemma 1,
φi =
∑
v∈V
∑|N |−1
s=0 cˆ(|N | − 1, s,v)
s!(|N |−s−1)!
|N |! mi(v),
and the Shapley value can be calculated in time O((wmax + 1)
lbin+1|N |) using
the precomputed values of cˆ. The computation of cˆ dominates the application
of the Shapley value equation, and the overall running time is O(lbin(wmax +
1)lbin+1|N |2) per agent. ⊓⊔
4.2 Additive Approximation
Similar to the fully polynomial time approximation scheme for the classical knap-
sack problem (see [21]), we show an approximation scheme for the Shapley value
by rounding down the weights wi’s and computing the Shapley value of the
cooperative game (N, v′) where v′ is an approximation of v. Our technique of
computing the Shapley value by approximating the characteristic function v is
deterministic and does not require concentration inequalities like the standard
statistical methods of sampling and normal distribution techniques in [4, 9].
The following lemma formalizes how an approximation of the characteristic
function v leads to an additive error in the Shapley value computation (see
Appendix A for a proof):
Lemma 2. If v′ is an α-additive approximation of v, i.e., v′(S) ≤ v(S) ≤
v′(S) + α for all S ⊆ N , then the Shapley value φ′i computed with respect to v
′
is within an α-additive error of the Shapley value φi computed with respect to v,
for all i.
When wmax is sufficiently larger than lbin, the approximation scheme’s run-
ning time is faster than that of the exact algorithm of Theorem 2:
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Theorem 3. In the knapsack budgeted games, the Shapley value can be com-
puted within an ǫwmax-additive error in O((lbin
2/ǫ+1)lbin+1|N |2) for each agent,
where ǫ > 0.7
Proof. We construct an approximate characteristic function v′ of v as follows.
Let ǫ > 0 and k = ǫwmax/lbin. Note that when lbin
2/ǫ < wmax, k > 1. For
each agent i, let the rounded weight w′i be ⌊
wi
k
⌋. The lengths do not change. To
compute v′(S), we compute the optimal set S′ ⊆ S, using dynamic programming,
with respect to the rounded weights w′1, . . . , w
′
|N | and let v
′(S) = k
∑
i∈S′ w
′
i. In
other words, v′(S) = k ·maxS′⊆S:l(S′)≤lbin w
′(S) for all S ⊆ N , where we use the
shorthand notation w′(S) =
∑
k∈S w
′
k.
We show v(S) ≥ v′(S) ≥ v(S) − ǫwmax, for all S ⊆ N . Let S be a subset
and TO, T
′ ⊆ S be the optimal subsets using original and rounded weights,
respectively, such that v(S) = w(TO) and v
′(S) = k · w′(T ′). Note that both
optimal sets have cardinality at most lbin. Because of rounding down, wi −
kw′i ≤ k and
∑
j∈TO
wj − k
∑
j∈TO
w′j ≤ klbin. Since T
′ is optimal with respect
to the rounded weights,
∑
j∈T ′ w
′
j ≥
∑
j∈TO
w′j . Then, v
′(S) = k
∑
j∈T ′ w
′
j ≥
k
∑
j∈TO
w′j ≥
∑
j∈TO
wj − klbin = v(S) − ǫwmax. Since wi ≥ kw′i for all i,
v(S) = w(TO) ≥ w(T ′) ≥ kw′(T ′) = v′(S). Hence, v′ is an ǫwmax-additive
approximation of v. Then, the Shapley value computed with respect to v′ is
within ǫwmax of the original Shapley value by Lemma 2.
We now compute the Shapley value with respect to v′. For A ⊆ N , 0 ≤ b ≤
lbin, we define V
′
A,b = maxS′⊆A:l(S′)≤b w
′(S′). For a subset S ⊆ N , we define
vector V′S = (V
′
S,0, . . . , V
′
S,lbin
). Note that w′i = ⌊
wi
k
⌋ ≤ ⌊wmax
k
⌋ = ⌊ lbin
ǫ
⌋. Then,
we can upper bound w′(S) ≤ lbin⌊
lbin
ǫ
⌋, for all S. Let V ′ = {0, . . . , lbin⌊
lbin
ǫ
⌋}lbin+1
that vectorsV′S are contained in. Note v
′(S) = k ·V′S(lbin) for all S. From vector
V′S , we can compute agent i’s marginal contribution to S with respect to v
′ in
constant time: v′(S ∪ {i})− v′(S) = k ·max{V′S(lbin − li) + w
′
i −V
′
S(lbin), 0}.
From here, we follow the proof of Theorem 2. We compute the analogue of
cˆ in O((lbin
2/ǫ + 1)lbin+1|N |2), and this is the dominating term in the Shapley
value computation with respect to v′. ⊓⊔
5 Greedy Knapsack Budgeted Games
Motivated by the approximation scheme in Theorem 3, we investigate greedy
knapsack budgeted games, a variant of knapsack budgeted games, and show the
Shapley value in these games can be computed in pseudo-polynomial time. A
greedy knapsack budgeted game has the same representation as the knapsack
budgeted games, but its characteristic function is computed by a 2-approximation
heuristic for the classical knapsack problem. We defer proofs to Appendix B.
7 For agent i, its Shapley value φi is clearly in [0, wmax]. Using the approximation
scheme, we can compute φi within
1
7
wmax for instance. As long as ǫ > lbin
2/wmax,
the approximation scheme has a faster running time than the exact algorithm in
Theorem 2; this observation about ǫ is also true for the fully polynomial time ap-
proximation scheme for the classical knapsack problem (see [21]).
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Algorithm 1 Greedy Heuristic A′(S, lbin)
1: Let a = argmaxk∈S wk.
2: Select agents in S in decreasing order of wi
li
and stop when the next agent does not
fit into the bin of size lbin; let S
′ be the selected agents.
3: Return S′ if w(S′) ≥ wa, or {a} otherwise.
Theorem 4. In the greedy knapsack budgeted games (N, v) with v(S) = A′(S, lbin)
for all S, the Shapley value can be computed in O(lbin
5wmax
5|N |8) for each agent,
where the greedy heuristic A′(S, lbin) is computed as in Algorithm 1.
While motivated by knapsack budgeted games, we use a different proof tech-
nique using the following lemma to prove Theorem 4. It generalizes the observa-
tion that in the simple cooperative game (N, v) where the agents have weights
w1, . . . , w|N | and the characteristic function v is additive, i.e., v(S) =
∑
k∈S wk,
the Shapley value φi is exactly wi for all i.
Lemma 3. Assume that the cooperative game (N, v) has a representation (M,w,A)
where M is a set, w :M → R is a weight function, and A : 2N → 2M is a map-
ping such that v(S) =
∑
e∈A(S) w(e), ∀S ⊆ N . Let c+(i, s, e) = #{S ⊆ N \ {i} :
|S| = s, e ∈ A(S ∪ {i})} and c−(i, s, e) = #{S ⊆ N \ {i} : |S| = s, e ∈ A(S)},
for i ∈ N , e ∈M , and 0 ≤ s ≤ |N | − 1. Then, the Shapley value for agent i can
be computed as
φi =
∑
e∈M
∑|N |−1
s=0 (c+(i, s, e)− c−(i, s, e))
s!(|N |−s−1)!
|N |! w(e).
in time O(t|M ||N |) where t is an upper bound on the computation time of the
coefficients c+ and c−.
6 Generalizations
We present generalizations of our proof techniques and propose an unifying
framework that captures a broad class of cooperative games in which comput-
ing the Shapley value is tractable, including many known classes of coopera-
tive games in [7, 14, 16] and those with concise representations using schemes
in [6, 10, 1]. The main idea is that the problem of computing the Shapley value
reduces to that of finding an efficient algorithm for the cooperative game’s char-
acteristic function. More precisely, if a cooperative game (N, v) is described in
terms of an alternative representation I and an algorithm A with low time and
space complexities that computes v, formalized in terms of decomposition, then
we can compute the Shapley value efficiently. To illustrate the generalizations’
applicability, we use them to give examples of cooperative games in which the
Shapley value can be computed efficiently.
For each generalization, we consider two cases: the order-agnostic case in
which A processes agents in an arbitrary order, and the order-specific case in
which A processes in a specific order, like the greedy heuristic in Theorem 4.
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Algorithm 2 Computing A(I, S) with a decomposition (Asetup, Aupdate, Afinal)
1: Asetup(I) outputs I
′, x
2: for i ∈ S do
3: x = Aupdate(I
′, i,x)
4: end for
5: Return Afinal(I
′,x)
Definition 1. Assume a cooperative game (N, v) has an alternative representa-
tion I and a deterministic algorithm A such that v(S) = A(I, S) for all S ⊆ N .
Algorithm A has a decomposition (Asetup, Aupdate, Afinal) if A(I, S) can be com-
puted as in Algorithm 2. We denote the the running times of the sub-algorithms
of the decomposition tsetup, tupdate and tfinal, respectively.
In Algorithm 2, x = (x1, x2, . . .) is a vector of variables that is initialized
to some values independent of subset S and determines the algorithm A’s final
return value. I ′ is an auxiliary data structure or states that only depend on the
representation I and is used in subsequent steps for ease of computation; I ′ can
be simply I if no such preprocessing is necessary. Theorem 2 can be generalized
as follows:
Theorem 5. Assume a cooperative game (N, v) has an alternative representa-
tion I and a deterministic algorithm A that computes v. If A has a decompo-
sition (Asetup, Aupdate, Afinal) such that at most n(I) variables x are used with
each taking at most m(I) possible values as S ranges over all subsets of N , then
the Shapley value can be computed in O(tsetup + tupdatem
n|N |2 + tfinalmn|N |)
for each agent. In order-specific cases, for Steps 2-4 of Algorithm 2, the run-
ning time is O(tsetup + tupdatem
2n|N |2 + tfinalm2n|N |). Note that n and m are
representation-dependent numbers and the argument I has been omitted.
Proof. Given the alternative representation I, we compute the Shapley value of
agent i. We associate v(S) with the final values, xS,final, of n(I) variables x in
A(I, S), for all S ⊆ N \ {i}. We partition 2N\{i} by the pair (|S|,xS,final) into
at most mn|N | partitions, omitting the argument I from n and m. Let X be
the set of all possible final values of the variables x; note that its cardinality
is at most mn. We compute the cardinalites of the partitions using dynamic
programming. Let N ′ = N \ {i}, ordered and relabeled 1, . . . , |N | − 1, and i =
|N |. For 0 ≤ j ≤ |N | − 1, 0 ≤ s ≤ j, and v ∈ X , we define cˆ(j, s,v) =
#
{
S ⊆ N ′1,j : |S| = s,xS,final = v
}
. Then, cˆ has the recurrence relation
cˆ(j, s,v) = cˆ(j − 1, s,v) +
∑
u:Aupdate(I′,j,u)=v
cˆ(j − 1, s− 1,u)
with the base case cˆ(0, 0, s) = 1, where s is the initial states of variables x.
Using Asetup, we compute I
′ and the inital values s in O(tsetup). Using the
recurrence relation and Aupdate, we compute cˆ(j, s,v) for all j, s, and v in time
O(tupdatem
n|N |2). Note that for a subset S ⊆ N \ {i}, we can compute agent i’s
marginal contribution to S, i.e., v(S ∪{i})− v(S), in O(tupdate+ tfinal) from the
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Algorithm 3 Computing A(S) with a per-element decomposition
{(Aesetup, A
e
update, A
e
final)}e∈M
1: Initialize S′ = ∅
2: for e ∈M do
3: Aesetup(M,w) outputs I
′, x
4: For i ∈ S: x = Aeupdate(I
′, i,x)
5: If Afinal(I
′,x) = 1, S′ = S′ ∪ {e}
6: end for
7: Return S′
final values of x associated with the partition that S belongs to, i.e., xS,final; let
mi(v) be the agent i’s marginal contribution to subsets associated with v ∈ X .
By Lemma 1,
φi =
∑
v∈X
∑|N |−1
s=0 cˆ(|N | − 1, s,v)
s!(|N |−s−1)!
|N |! mi(v),
and the Shapley value can be calculated in time O((tupdate+ tfinal)m
n|N |) using
the precomputed values of cˆ. The overall running time is O(tsetup+tupdatem
n|N |2+
(tupdate + tfinal)m
n|N |).
Now assume that the agents have to be processed in a specific order deter-
mined by representation I. For a given S and its final values xS,final, we cannot
compute xS∪{i},final asAupdate(I
′, i,xS,final) and compute agent i’s marginal con-
tribution to S, because it would violate the order if some agents in S have to
be processed after i. Instead, we associate S with the final values xS,final and
xS∪{i},final and partition 2
N\{i} by the tuple (|S|,xS,final,xS∪{i},final) into at
most m2n|N | partitions, omitting the argument I. Following the same argument
as before, we get the running time O(tsetup+tupdatem
2n|N |2+tfinalm2n|N |). ⊓⊔
The following definition and theorem generalize Theorem 4 and can also be
considered a specialization of Theorem 5. See Appendix C for proof details.
Definition 2. Assume a cooperative game (N, v) has an alternative representa-
tion (M,w,A) as described in Lemma 3 such that v(S) =
∑
e∈A(S) w(e), for all
S ⊆ N . Algorithm A has a per-element decomposition (Aesetup, A
e
update, A
e
final)
for all e ∈ M if A(S) can be computed as in Algorithm 3. We denote the upper
bounds, over all e ∈M , on running times of the sub-algorithms of the per-element
decomposition tsetup, tupdate and tfinal, respectively.
Theorem 6. Assume a cooperative game (N, v) has an alternative represen-
tation (M,w,A), as given in Lemma 3. If A has a per-element decomposi-
tion (Aesetup, A
e
update, A
e
final) for all e ∈ M such that at most n(M,w) vari-
ables x are used with each taking at most m(M,w) possible values as S ranges
over all subsets of N and e over M , the Shapley value can be computed in
O((tsetup + tupdatem
n|N |2 + tfinalmn|N |)|M |) for each agent. In order-specific
cases, for Step 4 of Algorithm 3, the running time is O((tsetup+tupdatem
2n|N |2+
tfinalm
2n|N |)|M |). Note that n and m are representation-dependent numbers and
the argument (M,w) has been omitted.
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The above definitions apply broadly and suggest the following framework
for cooperative games that we term algorithmic representation; we represent
each cooperative game (N, v) in terms of an alternative representation I and an
accompanying algorithm A that computes v. As we can represent any coopera-
tive game by a table with exponentially many entries for v values and a simple
lookup algorithm, the algorithmic representation always exist. The main chal-
lenge is to determine an “efficient” algorithmic representation for cooperative
games in general. The algorithmic representation framework subsumes the con-
cise representation schemes in [6, 10, 1] as these assume specific structures on the
alternative representation I. It also captures the notion of classes of cooperative
games for we can represent a class of cooperative games by a set of alternative
representations corresponding to those games in the class. In this framework,
Theorems 5 and 6 show that if the algorithms for computing v satisfy the de-
composability properties outlined in Definitions 1 and 2, then the Shapley value
can be computed efficiently as long as these algorithms are efficient.
Using the generalizations, we can reproduce many previous results on efficient
computation of the Shapley value up to a (pseudo) polynomial factor in the
running time.8 As concrete examples, we prove several such results (and a new
one on the Data Mining Problem in Section 1). We defer proofs to Appendix C:
Corollary 1. (Weighted Majority Games) Assume a cooperative game (N, v)
has a representation given by |N | + 1 nonnegative integers q, w1, . . . , w|N | such
that v(S) is 1 if
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q, or 0 otherwise. Then, the Shapley value can be
computed in pseudo-polynomial time O(q|N |2) for each agent. (Identical to [14])
Corollary 2. (MC-net Representation) Assume a cooperative game (N, v) has a
marginal-contribution (MC) net representation with boolean rules R = {r1, . . . , rm}
with each ri having value vi and of the form (p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pa ∧ ¬n1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬nb)
such that v(S) =
∑
ri:Ssatisfies ri
vi for all S ⊆ N .9 Then, the Shapley value can
be computed in O(m|N |2(maxi |ri|)2) for each agent, where |r| is the number of
literals in rule r. (Compare to O(mmaxi |ri|), linear time in the representation
size, in [10])
Corollary 3. (Multi-Issue Representation) Assume a cooperative game (N, v)
has a multi-issue representation with subsets C1, . . . , Ct ⊆ N and characteristic
functions vi : 2
Ci → R for all i such that v(S) =
∑t
i=1 vi(S ∩Ci) for all S ⊆ N .
Then, the Shapley value can be computed in O(t2maxi |Ci||N |2maxi |Ci|) for each
agent. (Compare to O(t2maxi |Ci|) in [6])
Corollary 4. (Data Mining Problem) Assume a cooperative game (N, v) has a
representation given by |N | + 1 nonnegative integers k, w1, . . . , w|N | such that
8 The slightly slower running times can be attributed to our generalizations’ inability
to derive closed form expressions on a game-by-game basis; for instance, evaluating
the sum
∑n
i=1 i in O(n) instead of using the identity
n(n+1)
2
=
∑n
i=1 i in O(1). As
generalizations apply in a black-box manner, we argue the loss in running time is
reasonable for (pseudo) polynomial time computation.
9 If r = (1 ∧ 2 ∧ ¬3), then S = {1, 2} satisfies r, but S = {1, 3} does not.
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v(S) = maxS′⊆S:|S′|≤k w(S
′). Then, the Shapley value can be computed in poly-
nomial time O(|N |3) for each agent. (This is our own problem.)
7 Further Discussion
We have introduced a class of cooperative games called budgeted games and
investigated the computational complexity of the Shapley value in the knapsack
version, knapsack budgeted games, in particular. We presented exact and ap-
proximation algorithms for knapsack budgeted games and a pseudo-polynomial
time algorithm for closely related greedy knapsack budgeted games. These algo-
rithms have only polynomial dependence on |N |, the number of agents, and are
more efficient than the na¨ıve exponential time algorithm when |N | is large. Our
results extend to knapsack budgeted games with multiple budget constraints. We
believe knapsack budgeted games are useful in modeling value division problems
in real-life scenarios and our algorithms applicable; for example, when finding a
profit distribution solution for a joint venture of, say, 100-plus agents.
We also provided generalizations and proposed the algorithmic representa-
tion framework in which we represent each cooperative game in terms of an
alternative representation and an accompanying algorithm that computes the
underlying value function. We formalized efficient algorithmic representations
and used the generalizations to show that computing the Shapley value in those
cooperative games with efficient algorithmic representations can be done effi-
ciently. To demonstrate the generalizations’ applicability, we proved old and
new results on the efficient computation of the Shapley value.
We note that further improvement to our algorithmic results might be pos-
sible. While the exact algorithm in Theorem 2 has polynomial time dependence
on |N |, it is not a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm and the hardness result in
Theorem 1 does not preclude the existence of a polynomial time algorithm for
the Shapley value computation in the restricted case of |N | ≫ lbin.
10 Similarly,
we do not know if the results in Theorems 3 and 4 are the best possible. We
pose these as open problems.
Finally, we believe our techniques can have applications beyond the games
considered in this paper and to other economic concepts such as the Banzhaf
index. It would be also interesting to investigate the computational complexity
of the Shapley value in other kinds of budgeted games.
Acknowledgements. We would like to thank Vasilis Gkatzelis for his helpful
comments.
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A Missing Proofs from Section 4
Proof. (Theorem 1) We reduce the decision version of the classical knapsack
problem, which is NP-complete, to the problem of computing the Shapley value.
If there is a polynomial time algorithm for the Shapley value computation, we
use it to compute the Shapley value of the agents, φ1, . . . , φ|N |. By the efficiency
property, φ1 + · · ·+ φ|N | = v(N), which is exactly the solution of the optimiza-
tion version of the classical knapsack problem. Then, we can solve the decision
version. ⊓⊔
Proof. (Lemma 1) We start from (1):
φi =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
f(|S|)(v(S ∪ {i})− v(S))
=
∑
S⊆N\{i}
pi∑
p=1
|N |−1∑
s=0
f(s)mi(p) Id(|S| = s, Pi(S) = p)
=
pi∑
p=1
|N |−1∑
s=0
f(s)mi(p)

 ∑
S⊆N\{i}
Id(|S| = s, Pi(S) = p)


=
pi∑
p=1
|N |−1∑
s=0
c(i, p, s)
s!(N − s− 1)!
N !
mi(p),
where f(x) = x!(|N |−x−1)!|N |! for a nonnegative integer x. Given the Shapley value
equation, the running time is straightforward to obtain. ⊓⊔
Proof. (Lemma 2) We bound the agent i’s marginal contribution to S with
respect to v′: v′(S∪{i})−v′(S) ≤ v(S∪{i})−(v(S)−α) = v(S∪{i})−v(S)+α,
and v′(S ∪ {i})− v′(S) ≥ v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) − α. Then, marginal contributions
computed with respect to v and v′ are within α of each other. Using the Shapley
value equation φi =
1
|N |!
∑
π∈Π v(P
i
π ∪ {i})− v(P
i
π),
|φi − φ
′
i| =
∣∣∣∣∣
1
|N |!
∑
π∈Π
(v(P iπ ∪ {i})− v(P
i
π))−
1
|N |!
∑
π∈Π
(v′(P iπ ∪ {i})− v
′(P iπ))
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
1
|N |!
∑
π∈Π
∣∣(v(P iπ ∪ {i})− v(P iπ)
)
−
(
v′(P iπ ∪ {i})− v
′(P iπ)
)∣∣
≤
1
|N |!
∑
π∈Π
α
= α.
⊓⊔
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B Missing Proofs from Section 5
Proof. (Lemma 3) The proof is nearly identical to that of Lemma 1. We start
from (1):
φi =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
f(|S|)(v(S ∪ {i})− v(S))
=
∑
S⊆N\{i}
f(|S|)

 ∑
e∈A(S∪{i})
w(e) −
∑
e∈A(S)
w(e)


=
∑
S⊆N\{i}
∑
e∈M
|N |−1∑
s=0
f(s)w(e) (Id(Cs, e ∈ A(S ∪ {i}))− Id(Cs, e ∈ A(S)))
=
∑
e∈M
|N |−1∑
s=0
f(s)w(e)

 ∑
S⊆N\{i}
Id(Cs, e ∈ A(S ∪ {i}))−
∑
S⊆N\{i}
Id(Cs, e ∈ A(S))


=
∑
e∈M
|N |−1∑
s=0
(c+(i, e, s)− c−(i, e, s))
s!(|N | − s− 1)!
|N |!
w(e),
where f(x) = x!(|N |−x−1)!|N |! for a nonnegative integer x and Cs is the clause
|S| = s.
Given the Shapley value equation, the running time is straightforward to
obtain. ⊓⊔
Proof. (Theorem 4) We compute the Shapley value φi for some fixed agent i.
In what follows, we assume that the agents are sorted and reindexed so that
w1
l1
≥ . . . ≥
w|N|
l|N|
. If there are multiple agents with the same maximum weight
for the argmax operator, we choose the one with the lowest index.
For ease of exposition, we use A′′ to denote Step 2 of the greedy heuristic
so that A′′(S, b) is exactly the set S′ in A′(S, b). We also drop the bin size b
when it is equal to lbin. Note v(S) =
∑
k∈A′(S) wk = w(A
′(S)) for all S ⊆ N . In
order to use Lemma 3, we choose the alternative representation (M,w,A) where
M = N , the weight function w is such that w(e) = we, ∀e, and A is the greedy
heuristic A′. We consider three cases: e = i, e > i, and e < i.
Case 1) e = i: For c−(i, s, i), we count subsets S ⊆ N\{i} such that i ∈ A′(S).
Clearly, c−(i, s, i) = 0. For c+(i, s, i), we count subsets S ⊆ N \ {i} such that
i ∈ A′(S ∪ {i}). Note i ∈ A′(S ∪ {i}) if 1) agent i is included in S′ in Step
2 of A′ and S′ is finally returned in Step 3, or 2) agent i is not included in
S′, but is selected in Step 1 and finally returned in Step 3. To each subset
S ⊆ N \ {i}, we divide the set S into two parts, S1,i−1 and Si+1,|N |, and
associate tuple (s1, lˆ, wˆ1, a1, s2, wˆ2, a2) where |S1,i−1| = s1, l(A′′(S1,i−1)) = lˆ,
w(A′′(S1,i−1)) = wˆ1, argmaxk∈S1,i−1 wk = a1, |Si+1,|N || = s2, w(A
′′(Si+1,|N |)) =
wˆ2, and argmaxk∈Si+1,|N| wk = a2. Note the tuple has enough information to re-
construct the steps of the greedy heuristic and check aforementioned conditions.
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Since the total number of possible tuples is bounded, we count the number of
sets S ⊆ N \ {i} for each tuple and sum up to determine c+(i, s, i). We further
decouple steps of A′ on S1,i−1 and Si+1,|N | by using intermediate bin sizes, the
parameter b in the coefficient cˆ2b below, and consider each part independently
using smaller tuples (s1, lˆ, wˆ1, a1) and (s2, wˆ2, a2), respectively.
We define cˆ1(j, s1, lˆ, wˆ1, a1) = #{S ⊆ N1,j : |S| = s1, l(A′′(S)) = lˆ, w(A′′(S)) =
wˆ1, argmaxk∈S wk = a1}, for 1 ≤ j ≤ i − 1, and cˆ
2
b(j, s2, wˆ2, a2) = #{S ⊆
Ni+1,j : |S| = s2, w(A′′(S, b)) = wˆ2, argmaxk∈S wk = a2}, for i + 1 ≤ j ≤ |N |
and 0 ≤ b ≤ lbin. Then, the number of subsets S ⊆ N \ {i} with tuple
(s1, lˆ, wˆ1, a1, s2, wˆ2, a2) with i is contained in S
′ in Step 2 of A′(S) is the prod-
uct of the number of subsets S1 ⊆ N1,i−1 with tuple (s1, lˆ, wˆ1, a1) and the
number of subsets S2 ⊆ Ni+1,|N | with tuple (s2, wˆ2, a2), where the effective
bin size for S2 is lbin − lˆ − li. These sets satisfy the first set of conditions for
i ∈ A′(S ∪ {i}) if and only if Id(lˆ ≤ lbin − li, wˆ1 + wˆ2 + wi ≥ max{wa1 , wa2}) =
1. We reason similarly for the second set of conditions and get c+(i, s, i) =∑(
cˆ1 · cˆ2
lbin−lˆ−li
· Id(C1, C2) + cˆ1 · cˆ2
lbin−lˆ
· Id(C3, C4, C5)
)
, where the summation
is over s1 + s2 = s, 1 ≤ a1 < a2 ≤ |N |, 0 ≤ lˆ ≤ lbin, 0 ≤ wˆ1, wˆ2 ≤ wmax|N |;
cˆ1’s have argument (i − 1, s1, lˆ, wˆ1, a1) and cˆ
2’s have argument (|N |, s2, wˆ2, a2);
the conditions are C1 = (lˆ ≤ lbin − li), C2 = (wˆ1 + wˆ2 + wi ≥ max{wa1 , wa2}),
C3 = (lˆ > lbin − li), C4 = (i = argmaxk∈{a1,a2,i} wk), and C5 = (wi > wˆ1 + wˆ2).
Using dynamic programming, cˆ1 can be computed in O(lbinwmax|N |
3) and cˆ2b
for all 0 ≤ b ≤ lbin can be computed in O(lbinwmax|N |3). Hence, each coefficient
c+(i, s, i) can be computed in O(lbinwmax
2|N |4) using precomputed values of cˆ1
and cˆ2b .
The analyses for the other cases are similar. We divide the set N at i and e
into three parts and associate each subset satisfying e ∈ A′(S∪{i}) or e ∈ A′(S)
a tuple that summarizes the steps of the greedy heuristic over these parts. Then,
we proceed as before and compute each coefficient, c+(i, s, e) and c−(i, s, e), in
O(lbin
5wmax
5|N |6).
Putting all the cases together, we can compute the necessary coefficients
c(i, e, s) in time O(lbin
5wmax
5|N |6) per coefficient. By Lemma 3, we can compute
the Shapley value in pseudo-polynomial time of O(lbin
5wmax
5|N |8). ⊓⊔
C Missing Proofs from Section 6
Proof. (Theorem 6) Given the alternative representation (M,w), we compute
the Shapley value of agent i using Lemma 3. We show how to compute the
quantity φi,e =
∑|N |−1
s=0 (c+(i, s, e) − c−(i, s, e))
s!(|N |−s−1)!
|N |! for some arbitrary
e ∈ M . We associate v(S) with the final states, xS,final, of n(M,w) variables x
in A for all S ⊆ N \ {i}. We partition 2N\{i} by the pair (|S|,xS,final) into at
most mn|N | partitions, omitting the argument (M,w) from n and m.Let X be
the set of all final values of the variables x in A. We compute the cardinalities
of the partitions using dynamic programming. Let N ′ = N \ {i}, ordered and
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relabeled 1, . . . , |N | − 1 and i = |N |. For 0 ≤ j ≤ |N | − 1, 0 ≤ s ≤ j, and v ∈ X ,
we define cˆ(j, s,v) = #
{
S ⊆ N ′1,j : |S| = s,xS,final = v
}
. cˆ has the recurrence
relation cˆ(j, s,v) = cˆ(j − 1, s,v) +
∑
u:Ae
update
(I′,j,u)=v cˆ(j − 1, s− 1,u) with the
base case cˆ(0, 0, s) = 1, where s is the initial states of variables x. UsingAesetup, we
compute I ′ and the inital values s in O(tsetup). Using the recurrence relation and
Aeupdate, we compute cˆ(j, s,v) for all j, s, and v in time O(tupdatem
n|N |2). Note
that for a subset S ⊆ N \ {i}, we can compute if e ∈ A(S) and if e ∈ A(S ∪ {i})
in O(tfinal) using the information associated with the partition that S belongs
to. Then, we can compute the quantity φi,e in O(tfinalm
n|N |) using precomputed
values of cˆ, and the Shapley value φi =
∑
e∈M φi,e in O((tsetup+tupdatem
n|N |2+
tfinalm
n|N |)|M |) overall.
For the order-specific case, we follow the same line of reasoning as in Theo-
rem 5. ⊓⊔
Proof. (Corollary 1) We use the order-agnostic version of Theorem 5 with rep-
resentation I = (q, w1, . . . , w|N |). We construct algorithm A with decomposition
(Asetup, Aupdate, Afinal) as follows. As variables x, we use an indicator variable
taking values 0, . . . , q to represent that total weight of subset of agents, capped
at q. In Asetup, we initialize x to 0. In Aupdate, for given i ∈ S, we update the
indicator variable by adding wi to its value while capping the total at q, In
Afinal, we return 1 if x = q, or 0 otherwise. Therefore, n(I) = 1, m(I) = q + 1,
tsetup = O(1), tupdate = O(1), and tfinal = O(1). This leads to an O(q|N |2) algo-
rithm for computing the Shapley value for each agent. ⊓⊔
Proof. (Corollary 2) We use the order-agnostic version of Theorem 6 with rep-
resentation (M,w,A) where M = {er : r ∈ R}, w(er) = vr for each rule r,
and A(S) = {er : S satisfies r}. For each er ∈ M , we construct a per-element
decomposition (Asetup, Aupdate, Afinal) for A, omitting the superscript e. Assume
the rule r is (p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pa ∧ ¬n1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬nb) where each literal represents an
agent. In Asetup, we create a 0/ ± 1 array of length |N | with +1’s in the posi-
tions corresponding to agents with positive literals in r, −1’s in the positions
corresponding to agents with negative literals, and 0’s elsewhere. As variables
x, we use two counters: x1 that is initialized to 0 and incremented by 1 for
each occurrence of positive literal agent in S, and x2 that is initialized to b and
decremented by 1 for each occurrence of negative literal agent in S. In words,
x1 is equal to the number of positive literal agents in S and b − x2 is equal to
the number of negative literal agents in S. In Aupdate, for given i ∈ S, we check
the agent’s value in the array and update the variables accordingly. In Afinal,
we output 1 if x1 = a and x2 = b, or 0 otherwise. Therefore, n(M,w) = 2,
m(M,w) = maxi|ri|, tsetup = O(|N |), tupdate = O(1), and tfinal = O(1). This
leads to an O(m|N |2(maxi |ri|)2) algorithm for computing the Shapley value for
each agent. ⊓⊔
Proof. (Corollary 3) We use the order-agnostic version of Theorem 6 with rep-
resentation (M,w,A) where M = {eiC : 1 ≤ i ≤ t, C ⊆ Ci}, w(eiC) = vi(C)
for all i and C ⊆ Ci, and A(S) = {e1,S∩C1, . . . , et,S∩Ct} for all S ⊆ N . Note
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|M | =
∑
i 2
|Ci|. We construct per-element decomposition (Asetup, Aupdate, Afinal)
for each e ∈ M for A, omitting superscript e. Assume eiC ∈ M . As variable x,
we use a counter for the number of elements of S, to be given as an input, in
C. In Asetup, we initialize a 0/1 array of length |N | with 1’s in the positions
corresponding to elements in C and 0’s elsewhere. In Aupdate, for given i ∈ S, we
increment x if i ∈ C. In Afinal, we check that x = |C|. Therefore, n(M,w) = 1,
m(M,w) = maxi |Ci|, tsetup = O(|N |), tupdate = O(1), and tfinal = O(1). This
leads to an O(t2maxi |Ci||N |2maxi |Ci|) algorithm for computing the Shapley
value for each agent. ⊓⊔
Proof. (Corollary 4) We use the order-agnostic version of Theorem 6 with rep-
resentation (M,w,A) where M = N , w(i) = wi for all i, and
A(S) = {at most k top agents by weight in S}. For simplicity, we assume the
weights are all different; otherwise, we break ties consistenetly. For each e ∈M ,
we construct a per-element decomposition (Asetup, Aupdate, Afinal), omitting the
superscript e. As variables x, we use a counter that counts the number of agents
with weight greater than agent e’s, capped at k. In Asetup, we initialize the
counter x to 0. In Aupdate, for given i ∈ S, we increment the counter if wi > we,
capping the counter at k. In Afinal, we output 1 if x < k, or 0 otherwise.
Therefore, n(M,w) = 1, m(M,w) = k + 1, tsetup = O(1), tupdate = O(1), and
tfinal = O(1). This leads to an O(k|N |2) algorithm for computing the Shapley
value for each agent.
If k ≥ |N |, then v(S) =
∑
i∈S wi for all S and the Shapley value of agent i
is simply wi. So, we can compute the Shapley value in O(1) for each agent after
reading the representation. If k < |N |, then the above algorithm suffices and
its running time reduces to O(|N |3). In either case, we get a polynomial time
algorithm. ⊓⊔
